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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LABOR LAW-Public Employees' First Amendment Right to Freedom of Association
Violated by State Dismissal Based on Political Party Membership.
"To the victors belong the spoils" has been a basic premise of Illinois
politics for years, and so when Paul Powell, the Democratic Secretary
of State, passed away, no one was surprised that G.O.P. Governor
Richard Ogilvie appointed a Republican, John Lewis, to fill the post.
Among Lewis' first acts was the replacement of Democratic employees
by Republicans.
Much to the chagrin of the new Secretary of State, who knew the
unwritten rules of Illinois politics and expected even Democrats to
abide by them, a number of employees balked at the idea of losing
their jobs, and instead of gracefully withdrawing until another election
might bring them better fortune, decided to fight back through the
courts.
The individual plaintiffs were non-civil service, non-policy making employees of the Illinois Secretary of State. The plaintiffs brought a class
action in the federal district court' claiming that they had been discharged because of their political affiliations, and that the discharges
violated their first amendment right to freedom of association as applied
to the state by the fourteenth amendment. Plaintiffs also alleged that
the summary dismissal had violated their procedural due process rights
of prompt notice and hearing. Plaintiffs sought reinstatement to their
jobs, back pay, and an injunction restraining the Secretary of State
from firing employees in the future on the basis of political affiliation.
Federal jurisdiction was predicated on the Civil Rights Act of 1871.1
The defendant contended that plaintiffs failed to state a cause of
action, filing a motion for summary judgment supported by an affidavit stating other grounds for plaintiffs' dismissals. Plaintiffs in turn
propounded written interrogatories to the defendant and filed 94 affi1. Illinois State Employees Union, Council 34, American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. Lewis, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Illinois, Southern Division, Omer Poos, Judge, No. 4743.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
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davits indicating that the firings were politically motivated. Five of
the affiants stated that they had been requested to switch party allegiance as a prerequisite to keeping their jobs. 3 The district court
granted defendant's motion, holding that plaintiffs' affidavits were insufficient as a matter of law, and that answers to their interrogatories
(which had not yet been filed) could not lead to the discovery of relevant evidence creating a material issue of fact. 4 In a two to one decision, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded,
holding that the district court erred when it granted summary judgment. The court found that the record did not support a factual finding that no plaintiff was dismissed for an impermissible reason, or a legal conclusion that defendant was justified in predicating continued
employment on support of the Republican Party.5
The Seventh thereby became the first circuit in the United States to
explicitly recognize the rights of non-tenured, non-civil service public
employees to retain their jobs in the face of politically motivated dismissals. In doing so, the court rejected the decision of the Second
Circuit in Alomar v. Dwyer,6 and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
in American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,
AFL-CIO v. Shapp,7 both of which found no violation of constitutionally
protected rights under similar circumstances.
FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUE

The political rights of public employees had been disputed long before 1892 when Mr. Justice Holmes, sitting on the Massachusetts Supreme Court, cryptically noted: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman."'8 The doctrine expressed in Holmes' statement was coined
"right-privilege." The petitioner may have had a constitutional right to
freedom of speech, but the benefit of government employment, or
"largess" as it became known, was a privilege which could be applied
or withdrawn by the state for any reason. No one had a "right" to a
government job analogous to his "right" to freedom of speech.
This line of reasoning continued unchallenged into the present
century, surfacing in 1927 at the infamous Scopes "Monkey Trial,"
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
(1892).
9.
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Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 565.
Id. at 576.
447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971), 2-1 decision, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1020 (1972).
443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375 (1971); 4-3 decision.
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517
Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 109-10, 111-12, 289 S.W. 363, 364-65 (1927):
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and again in 1951 when an equally divided United States Supreme
Court affirmed Bailey v. Richardson'° without opinion. The circuit
court in Bailey noted that the "first amendment guarantees free speech
and free assembly, but it does not guarantee Government employ.""
To Judge Kiley, dissenting in Lewis, the Second Circuit in Alomar, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Shapp, Holmes' aphorism
of 1892 remains a correct statement of the law. The United States Supreme Court's refusal to grant certiorari in Alomar" may lend credence
to this position, though in view of post-Bailey decisions and extensive
criticism of the right-privilege doctrine Bailey espouses, it is too early to
forecast reversal of the legal conclusion reached in Lewis if and when
the Supreme Court settles the conflict between the circuits. Certiorari
in Lewis was denied February 20, 1973.1"
The earliest modern cases discussing the privilege of public employees to exercise political rights came in the late forties and early fifties
with United Public Workers v. Mitchell,'4 Bailey v. Richardson, and
Alder v. Board of Education of City of New York."' These cases
represent the high water mark of right privilege from which the doctrine has been in slow but steady retreat. The majority opinion by
Judge Stevens in Lewis cited Mitchell and Bailey in a discussion of
the line of cases demarking the rise and fall of the doctrine.
The earliest of the cases, Mitchell, upheld the constitutionality of
the Hatch Act,' 6 a federal statute enacted to promote governmental efficiency by withholding "active" political rights from most federal employees. The Lewis majority correctly noted that this decision could
not be taken as a blanket denial of political rights to public employees:
There was no dispute within the [Mitchell] Court over the proposition that the employees' interests in political action were protected
by the First Amendment. The Justices' different conclusions
stemmed from their different 7appraisals of the sufficiency of the
justification for the restriction.'
[Petitioner] had no right or privilege to serve the state except upon such
terms as the state prescribed ....

In dealing with its own employees en-

gaged upon its own work, the state is not hampered by the limitations of...
the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
10. 341 U.S.918 (1951).
11. Bailey v.Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 59 (D.C.Cir. 1950).
12. Alomar v.Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1020
(1972).
13. The Supreme Court denied petitions for certiorari from both defendant and
plaintiff. Defendant sought review of the portion of the decision relating to first
amendment rights while plaintiff questioned the due process holding.
14. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
15. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
16. 53 Stat. 1148 (1939), 54 Stat. 767 (1940), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7324-27,
1501-08 (Supp. IV, 1969).
17. 473 F.2d at 569, 570.
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Justice Reed, writing for the majority in Mitchell, stated:
[T]his court must balance the extent of the guarantees of freedom
against a Congressional enactment to protect a democratic society
against the supposed evil of political partisanship. . . . Appellants
urge. . . that Congress may not 'enact a regulation providing that
no Republican, Jew or Negro shall be appointed to federal office,
or that no federal employee shall attend Mass or take any active
part in missionary work.' None would deny such limitations of
Congressional power .... 18
The extent of the regulation allowed in Mitchell went only to partisan activity by federal employees, leaving untouched the right to be a
member of a political party or to participate in political decisions at the
ballot box. The question resolved in Mitchell, though seemingly related to that in Lewis, hinged on political activity rather than political
association. The court painstakingly emphasized that only action was
being circumscribed, and not membership. Regulation of political activity, 9 a more blatant form of association than mere membership in a
political party, was allowed only because it achieved the legitimate
governmental purpose of increased efficiency. Mitchell concluded that
courts should interfere with the federal government's regulation of its
employees only when such regulation went beyond generally existing
conceptions of governmental power developed from "practice, history,
and changing educational, social and economic conditions."20
Four years later, educational, social and economic conditions had
changed, and right-privilege had its finest hour: In the emotionally
charged political atmosphere of the early fifties, the Circuit Court of
the District of Columbia handed down Bailey v. Richardson, the authority upon which Alomar and the dissent in Lewis based their respective results.
The Lewis majority treated Bailey as just another case in the rightprivilege group, disposing of it in a footnote in a section of the opinion
which did not deal with the first amendment claim. This treatment
was unfortunate since the case has played such a prominent role in
patronage decisions. It may be that the majority felt that later cases
18. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947).
19. Typical "activities" are described in the Illinois equivalent of the Hatch Act,
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967 ch. 24
§ 38(t): (1) Participating in the organization of any
political meeting; (2) Soliciting money for a political purpose; (3) Assisting at the
polls on behalf of a party or candidate; (4) Using influence or authority to coerce or
persuade a person to follow a particular course of political action; (5) Initiating or
circulating petitions on behalf of a candidate or political issue; (6) Distributing
campaign literature; (7) Making contributions of money on behalf of a candidate or
political issue.
20. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 102 (1947).
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interpreting Bailey so clearly laid to rest the right-privilege doctrine
upon which Bailey predicated the rights of public employees, that additional comment was unnecessary. Alternatively, Judge Kiley in dissent felt that the majority had relied primarily upon a footnote in Board
of Regents v. Roth"' to reject the Bailey premise.
The Roth footnote stated that the court has now "rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege'. 2 2 The dissent felt
this statement should be narrowly construed to encompass only procedural due process issues raised in Roth and not first amendment
rights, though the line of cases cited by the majority made this distinction academic. A reading of the majority's cases shows a refusal to
interpret Bailey as an absolute denial of government employees' political rights almost from the beginning, and a resultant decline of the
right-privilege doctrine in first amendment as well as due process cases.
Bailey involved a federal employee fired in accordance with civil
service regulations when the Executive Department discovered "reasonable grounds" for belief that she was disloyal to the government. Information had been received that she was or had been a member of the
Communist Party and several front organizations, and that she had associated with Communists. The court phrased the question presented:
"Must the government continue to employ a disloyal person or publically reveal the sources by which disloyalty is detected?" 23 The issue
was analyzed in the context of the United States' "adversary position
to a government whose most successful recent method of contest is the
infiltration of a government service by its sympathizers." 24
The plain hard fact is that so far as the Constitution is concerned
there is no prohibition against the dismissal of Government employees because of their political beliefs, activities or affiliations.
That document . . . does not prevent Republican Presidents from
dismissing Democrats or Democratic Presidents from dismissing Republicans. . . . The First Amendment guarantees free speech
25
and assembly, but it does not guarantee Government employ.
Despite these unequivocal statements, the court felt constrained to
quote Mitchell and state that there were boundaries on the power of
the government to regulate public employees in regard to their first
amendment rights: the act must be "reasonably deemed by Congress
21.

408 U.S. 564, 571 n.9 (1972); Judge Kiley's dissent in Lewis, 473 F.2d at 579.

22.

408 U.S. at 571 n.9.

23.
24.

Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
Id.

25. Id. at 59.
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to interfere with the efficiency of the public service.""6 It was hardly
surprising that the court found disloyalty such a reasonable ground for
dismissal.
27
One year later in Adler v. Board of Education of City of New York,
the court acknowledged that public employees had first amendment
rights, but stated they had no right to work for the government on
their own terms. Citing Mitchell, the court noted that employees of the
state school system had to work under "reasonable terms" laid down
by the state. These terms were reasonable in the Mitchell context:
reasonable to accomplish a valid state purpose.
There was no doubt after these cases that the state could constitutionally inhibit the political rights of its employees to a great degree.
However Wieman v. Updegraff,28 decided soon after Adler, reversed
the "right-privilege" trend, holding that fourteenth amendment protections extended to public servants whose exclusion from public employment was "patently arbitrary or discriminatory." The court noted that
while it was true the government could condition public employment
according to certain terms,
[T]o draw from this language the facile generalization that there is
no constitutionally protected right to public employment is to obscure the issue. . . . We need not pause to consider whether an
abstract right to public employment exists. It is sufficient to say
that constitutional protection does extend to the public servant
29
whose exclusion . . . is patently arbitrary or discriminatory.
Nearly ten years later, a second group of cases further examined the
status of constitutional rights of public employees. The most important of these from the standpoint of Lewis was Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Union v. McElroy,s° cited by the Lewis majority and by the
majority and dissent in State Employees v. Shapp. The Shapp majority quoted McElroy, stating that it had become a "settled principle"
that government employment could be revoked "at the will of the
appointing officer."'' 3 Nevertheless, the dissent in Shapp, as well as
the majority in Lewis, pointed out further language in McElroy which
placed this statement in context:
"Those cases [Mitchell and Wieman] demonstrate only that the
state and federal governments, even in the exercise of their in26.
27.
law to
28.
29.
30.
31.
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Id. at 60; United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947).
342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952): . . . public employees "have the right under our
assemble, speak, think and believe as they will."
344 U.S. 183 (1952).
Id. at 191-92.
367 U.S. 886 (1961).
Id. at 896; State Employees v. Shapp, 443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375, 377 (1971).
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ternal operations, do not constitutionally have the complete freedom of action enjoyed by a private employer. .

.

. We may assume

that [the discharged employee] could not constitutionally have
been excluded from the Gun Factory if the announced grounds for
her exclusion had been patently arbitrary or discriminatory-that
she could not
have been kept out because she was a Democrat or
32
a Methodist.
In the same year, the court handed down Torcaso v. Watkins,8" in
which denial of a state office for failure to declare a belief in God was
held to be an unconstitutional abridgment of first amendment rights.
The court stated:
[T]he fact, however, that a person is not compelled to hold public
office cannot possibly be an excuse for barring him from office by
state imposed criteria forbidden by the constitution. This was settled by our holding in Wieman v. Updegraff. .... ,,34
Lewis noted an earlier case, Shelton v. Tucker,3 5 in which public
employed teachers were fired because they refused to file affidavits
listing organizations to which they belonged. Like the plaintiffs in
Lewis, the teachers had no form of job security. The Supreme Court
held that this disclosure requirement impaired the teachers' rights of
free association which lay at the "foundation of a free society" and was
"closely allied to freedom of speech." 6
The Lewis court used Shelton as A springboard to Pickering v.
Board of Education,3 another academic freedom case in which teachers
were fired for allegedly exercising rights of free speech. The Supreme
Court in Pickering stated:
The theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected. .

.

. The problem in

any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
38
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.
32. Id. at 897, 898; Lewis, 473 F.2d at 570, 571. State Employees v. Shapp, (dissent), 443 Pa. 527, 539, 280 A.2d 375, 380 (1971).
33. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
34. Id. at 495-96.
35. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
36. Id. at 485-86.
37. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Pickering in turn relied on Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). Keyishian held that the theory that public employment
which could be denied altogether could be subjected to any condition, regardless of
how unreasonable, has been "uniformly rejected." 385 U.S. at 605-06.
38. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). See also United States v. Robe], 389 U.S. 258
(1967), in which an employee at a shipyard designated as a "defense facility" was
discharged because of his Communist affiliation. The court found that the employee's
freedom of association could not be curtailed by government action depriving him of
his employment unless the government could show a vital interest which dictated

this result.
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These cases refine the problem presented by the constitutional rights
of public employees on one hand, and the interests of the state on the
other. In essence, Holmes was correct in 1892, as was the Bailey court
in 1950: Standing alone, the statement that "petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right
to be a policeman, '"" is accurate. No one has a constitutional claim
to a government job just as no one has a constitutional right to appellate review,40 or education.4 1 However once the state provides this
largess it cannot withhold it arbitrarily. Restrictions must be reasonable in the light of some valid governmental interest.
As the majority in Lewis noted, this doctrine was reaffirmed in 1972
in Perry v. Sinderman.4 2 Sinderman involved a state college professor
who lacked tenure or contractual rights to re-employment, and was
fired for criticizing the college administration. The Supreme Court
held that lack of rights to re-employment did not defeat Perry's claim
that his dismissal was violative of his first and fourteenth amendment
rights:
For at least a quarter century, this Court has made clear that even
though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit
and even though the government may deny him the benefit for
any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the
government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on
a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government
could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would
in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to 'produce a result which [it] could not command directly.'
Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible ...
Most often we have applied [this] principle to denials of
public employment [citations omitted]. . . . We have applied
the principle regardless of the public employee's contractual or
other claim to a job. .... ,,43
It is evident from these statements of the law that right-privilege is
a doctrine of the past. A state cannot do indirectly that which it is not
allowed to do directly, in the Lewis case the suppression of public em39. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
40. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
41. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Schoen, Politics,
Patronage, and the Constitution, 3 IND. L.F. 35, 41 n.18 (1969).
State constitutions
may place obligations on the government to provide these, but the "right" to receive these benefits is measured against the federal constitution.
42. 408 U.S. 593 (1972), companion case to Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972).
43. 408 U.S. at 597; cited at 473 F.2d 571.
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ployees' first amendment rights of association, at least absent a showing
of a compelling state interest supporting the result.4 1
The dissent in Lewis and the majority in Alomar45 acknowledged
that right-privilege was no longer viable as it pertained to due process,
but argued that it still applied in first amendment cases or that doctrines which replaced it in such situations were inapplicable to patronage litigation.
Alomar suggested that right-privilege as expressed in Bailey still applied to first amendment rights, a curious position when considered in
light of post-Bailey decisions and the preferred status first amendment
rights have traditionally enjoyed. The dissent in Lewis, while stating
that it was persuaded by A lomar, proceeded to cite two cases dealing
with public employees' first amendment rights which had rejected rightprivilege 6 in favor of what Professor William Van Alstyne has called
"the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. '4 7 The dissent pointed
out that the doctrine has a "basic flaw," quoting Van Alstyne and implying that this flaw made the doctrine inapplicable to Lewis:
The basic flaw in the doctrine is its assumption that the same evil
results from attaching certain conditions to government connected
activity as from imposing such conditions on persons not connected with government. In many cases this may be true, but the
connection with the government may in certain circumstances make
otherwise unreasonable conditions quite reasonable .41
The problem with the dissenting analysis is that the strict unconstitutional conditions doctrine which Van Alstyne criticized was not applied in Lewis precisely because of its basic flaw. Rather, the court
used what Van Alstyne termed the "doctrine of unconstitutional effects:"
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has usually been applied only to regulations which directly forbid the enjoyment of an
explicit constitutional right. The doctrine has been of little assis44. A restatement of the Supreme Court's doctrine of "compelling government
interest:" "Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State
may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling." Bates
v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
45. Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482, 483 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1020 (1972): "We are not to be understood as saying, however, that in all circumstances may a provisional employee be summarily discharged." The court goes
on to discuss circumstances which would lead to violations of due process.
46. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Pickering v. Board of Education,
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
47. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1439, 1445-46 (1968): The doctrine declares that whenever
an express constitutional provision forbids the government to do something directly, it
equally forbids the government to do it indirectly.
48. Id. at 1448; Quoted at 473 F.2d 580.
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tance in those situations, however, where the regulation of status
in the public sector has had only an indirect effect on such a right,
without directly and wholly forbidding its exercise. The Supreme
Court has nonetheless occasionally protected the petitioner's status
under such circumstances by emphasizing the "unconstitutional effect" of the regulation, although still leaving undisturbed the conventional view that one has no constitutional right per se to status
in the public sector. .

.

. The Court attempts to balance compet-

ing public and private concerns to determine whether the regulation
as applied has a sufficient connection with important enough state
interests to outweigh 49the incidental effect on the constitutional rights
of the affected class.
The unconstitutional effects rationale is designed to circumvent the
rigidity of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which is absolute
and thereby impractical. Under unconstitutional conditions, any government abridgment of an explicit constitutional right is barred. Under unconstitutional effects, the competing interests are weighed. The
majority in Lewis acknowledged that in some situations a valid state
interest would outweigh the right of a public employee to unfettered
political association. The flaw in Alomar is its reliance on Bailey as
good law. The flaw in the Lewis dissent is this reliance coupled with
confusion of what is a valid state interest and what is a purely political
interest. The two are not necessarily coincidental.
In keeping with the unconstitutional effects doctrine, the Lewis majority analyzed three justifications brought forward by the state to legitimate their violation of the petitioners' rights.
The initial justification was that plaintiffs were beneficiaries of the
patronage system and should not have standing to object to its routine
and foreseeable consequences. As noted in State Employees v. Shapp,
those who "live by the political sword must be prepared to die by the
political sword." 50 This waiver of constitutional rights was a determinative factor in the Shapp decision, and was mentioned by the Lewis
majority as a possible defense for the state in future cases.
However in Lewis, unlike Shapp, there was no showing that all
plaintiffs or particular plaintiffs were originally hired as patronage
49. Id. at 1449: Van Alstyne suggests Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960),
as a good example of this type of case. In Shelton, teachers were fired when they refused to file affidavits listing organizations to which they belonged. This requirement
was found to impair the teachers' right of association: "It is not disputed that to
compel a teacher to disclose his every associational tie is to impair that teacher's right
of free association, a right closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like
free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society." 364 U.S. at 485-86.
50. 443 Pa. 527, 536, 280 A.2d 375, 378 (1971).
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employees. 5 The Lewis court refused to rule on the sufficiency or effect of the defense other than by reiterating that a waiver of constitutional rights will not lightly be assumed. It also warned that the right
waived in Shapp was construed as a "right to continued public em52
ployment," a right not recognized in Lewis.
The result of the waiver defense, if and when it is asserted, is in
doubt. The fact that public employees are non-civil service or nontenured does not automatically lead to the conclusion that they are
patronage employees. Even if the employee was politically sponsored
at the time of hiring, it is inconsistent to apply a waiver if political sponsorship was the only means by which the job could be obtained.
These circumstances involve coercion and could never be termed a
"voluntary waiver" as the law requires for validity. Additionally,
granting the defense serves only to continue the spoils system despite
3
legislative and judicial antipathy.1
The second justification advanced by the state to support discharge
of the petitioners was that political affiliation was a relevant and
proper criterion for dismissal from certain government positions.5 4
The state implied that eliminating politically motivated dismissals would
thwart the will of the people as expressed through the ballot box, since
successful candidates of one party, mandated by the electorate to carry
out their policies, would have difficulty in administering their programs
through the entrenched members of the other.
The Lewis majority recognized that this would be a legitimate argument as applied to employees in policy making offices or to those in
positions where personal loyalty to the policy maker was essential to
the efficient adminstration of government. Nevertheless, the court
noted that this justification, like that of waiver would not apply automatically to all non-tenured or non-civil service public employees since
all did not fit into policy making or loyalty positions. It would turn
51. Id. at 531. Plaintiffs freely admitted they were appointed "for political reasons."
52. 473 F.2d at 574.
53. Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482, 483 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1020 (1972), and State Employees v. Shapp, 443 Pa. 527, 536, 280 A.2d 375, 378
(1971), condemned the spoils system while recognizing its validity. United Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 121-23 (1947), dissent, merely condemned it. State
civil service statutes have placed many former patronage jobs under the merit system
to combat waste and inefficiency. See the Illinois Political Activity Act (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1967 ch. 241/, §§ 38(s)-38(v), and the Merit and Fitness provisions of the
Illinois personnel code, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967 ch. 127 . 63b104b. Also Hatch Act, 53
Stat. 1148 (1939), 54 Stat. 767 (1940), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7324-27, 1501-08
(Supp. IV, 1969).

54.

473 F.2d at 574.
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on a matter of proof, and could not therefore serve as a basis for summary judgment for the state.
The final justification advanced by the state was that effective administration of state government required public executives to have the
same latitude in hiring and firing that their fellows in the private sector enjoyed, and that a rule giving non-tenured employees an easily
alleged cause of action for wrongful discharge would inhibit managerial
discretion. 5
The majority held that this justification, like the others, must await
answers to plaintiffs' interrogatories since factual issues as to the sufficiency of the justification could hinge on information contained therein.
At the same time, however, the court acknowledged that this argument
appeared "to have the greatest force of the three," 56 especially in view
of the large numbers of employees potentially affected by the decision.
Yet citing Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, the majority
noted:
It is now axiomatic that the state and federal governments, even in
the exercise of their internal operations, do not constitutionally57have
the complete freedom of action enjoyed by a private employer.
The court argued that political considerations were a factor not often
found in the private sector in regards to employment; that this was a
factor tending toward less efficiency in government rather than more.
It also noted that the larger the number of employees affected, the
more urgent the need to preserve their first amendment rights. The
court felt that the problem of extensive litigation impairing governmental efficiency and clogging court procedures would arise only in
the context of extensive hiring and firing of state employees in circumstances affecting their rights of association. In the long run, the interests of the state in efficient management would be better served by barring politically motivated dismissals.
While these premises cannot be denied, it may be that the majority
was overzealous in determining what would or would not be best for
the state in the long run. While protection of individuals' constitutional rights is within the purview of the federal court, determining
what is good for the state is traditionally a matter for the state legislature. The majority comment may have been simply a dismissal of the
55. Id.
56. Id. See also concurring opinion at 578.
57. Id. at 575; Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 897-98
(1961).
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state's factual claim that patronage increased efficiency through the indirect means of promoting managerial discretion. The majority may
also have been alerting future parties as to lines of argument to which
the court would be receptive.
A direct statement by the court in this situation may have been more
appropriate. Maintaining the patronage system in the context of more
efficient state government, the major line of argument left open to the
state, seems to apply factually only in the limitations subscribed by the
state's second justification: in policy making and loyalty positions. In
other situations, patronage leads to inefficiency.5 The interests of the
state and the interests of the political party whose members govern the
state should not be confused.
Underlying these justifications is a rationale more basic to the concept of the role of the spoils system in American government: Proscribing patronage will devitalize and ultimately destroy the political
parties. As the parties decline, all levels of government in the United
States will be engulfed by an unresponsive bureaucracy composed of
entrenched and unimaginative civil servants exercising power unchecked by political responsibility.5 9 This reasoning is reflected in the
statement of a man who ought to know, Senator George Washington
Plunkett, late of Tammany Hall:
First, this great and glorious country was built up by political parties; second, parties can't hold together if their workers don't get
the offices when they win; third, if the parties go to pieces, the
government they built up must go to pieces, too; fourth, then there'll
be hell to pay. 60
This argument fuses the compelling interests of the state and of the
political parties, a proposition constitutionally as well as factually sus58. See Wilson, The Economy of Patronage, 69 J. POL. ECON. 369, 370 n.4
(1961), defining patronage jobs as "all those posts, distributed at the discretion of
political leaders, the pay for which is greater than the value of the public services
performed." Present civil service acts were passed in response to blatant misuses of
patronage and the resultant waste of public funds. Commonwealth v. Brownmiller,
141 Pa. Super. 107, 14 A.2d 907 (1940), is the sad tale of how 19,000 employees
found themselves working for the state highway department just before elections.
WALDBY, THE PATRONAGE SYSTEM IN OKLAHOMA (1950) at 5, describes how 8,000
employees were added to that state's highway department. KURTZMAN, METHODS OF
CONTROLLING VOTES IN PHILADELPHIA (1935) at 40: "The Organization thinks that
the man who spends a great deal of time . . . performing his necessary duties to
enable him to control the votes of that division, must be compensated from some
source. The . . . Organization, or any other political machine, cannot afford to pay
out of its treasury for all the services that these workers perform. The public payroll, therefore, serves as a very convenient source from which to draw the necessary
funds."
59. Advanced and discussed at length in Schoen, Politics, Patronage, and the
Constitution, 3 IND. L.F. 35, 84 (1969).
60. Id.
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Though advanced by certain political scientists with less per-

sonal stake in patronage than politicians, the argument's predictions

have not come to pass in light of large scale reductions in the number
of patronage jobs caused by adoption of civil service statutes.

62
mains little more than an alarmist forecast.

It re-

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS ISSUE

While the court found that first and fourteenth amendment rights
of non-civil service employees were protected, it found they had no
due process rights of prompt notice and hearing before discharge, reacting to the Supreme Court's reversal of the circuit's earlier decision in
Roth v. Board of Regents.63
The Supreme Court in Roth found that procedural due process applied only to deprivation of interests encompassed by the fourteenth
amendment's protection of liberty and property. To qualify as a deprivation of "liberty," the state's reasons for firing the employee must
involve charges which could seriously damage his standing and association in the community, 64 or impose a stigma or other disability upon
him which would foreclose his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities. 65 The majority in Lewis noted that "loss of a
patronage job would in no sense reflect adversely on the discharged
61. The place of patronage in the political process and the role of the parties in
the form of government enjoyed in the United States is relevant to an action such as
Lewis. The relationship between political parties and the government has been explored
more thoroughly by political scientists than by the judiciary, though the Supreme Court
has on occasion dealt with the problem. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968),
in which a state attempt to facilitate the two-party system in elections was found
violative of rights to vote and associate. The state tried to justify its action on grounds
of compromise and political stability. Clearly, the Constitution does not mandate a
two-party system..
Nevertheless, analysis of the relationship must be based on practicality: Should the
courts tamper with a system which clearly works, albeit with a degree of waste, to
preserve the rights of a few who knew what they were getting into when they worked
for and earned their patronage jobs? If there is a chance the outcome of the tampering would be adverse, would not the unconstitutional effects doctrine balance public and
private interests and possibly opt for the continuance of patronage? In view of the even
course of political events since the widespread passage of civil service acts, this argument is weak at best.
62. Schoen, Politics, Patronage, and the Constitution, 3 IND. L.F. 35, 85 n.186
(1969).
63. Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972): The Seventh Circuit held that a non-tenured
teacher hired by the state for a one year period was entitled to notice and hearing
rather than a summary refusal to rehire at the end of the period. The Supreme Court
held that under these circumstances, the teacher had no "liberty" or "property"
interest in his job which entitled him to these procedural protections.
64. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972). See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971); Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
65. Id. at 573, 574 n.13. Nor was the state action in Lewis a direct restraint on
a first amendment freedom, as required by Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575 n.14 (1972).
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employees' reputation," and that no charges of misconduct other than
those made in an effort to defend the suit (which the court felt to be of

no effect upon plaintiffs' community standing or chances for reemployment) had been lodged. 6
Likewise, the plaintiffs in Lewis were not deprived of any "property"
as defined by Roth. The Supreme Court noted that a person must
have more than an abstract need or desire for a state benefit before he
has a property interest in it. He must have a "legitimate claim of entitlement," based not on an interest created by the constitution, but one
"defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an inde'67
pendent source such as state law."

The court in Lewis stated that "one who takes a patronage job may
not even have an expectation of keeping it when the appointing officer
is replaced, let alone a legitimate claim of entitlement to such a job." 8
Non-civil service and non-tenured public employees thereby have no
property interest in their employment which would entitle them to procedural protection under the fourteenth amendment, absent a "clearly
implied" promise of continued employment which could be used as a
basis for this protection.69 Since no promise was alleged in Lewis,
summary judgment as to the procedural issue was correct.
66. 473 F.2d at 563, 564 n.l. This may be an unwarranted conclusion.
The
allegations of wrong-doing made by the secretary of state (see 473 F.2d at 564, n.2)
were not related to plaintiffs' duties with the state, though members of the community
or future employers may not have notice of this.
The court in Lewis relied on the fact that charges were brought against the dismissed employees after they had filed their suit. The court noted that procedural due
process may lie if the charges were made simultaneously with the dismissal. 473 F.2d
at 563, 564, n.1.
The problem with this distinction is that in each case where non-tenured employees
are forced to bring suit to vindicate their constitutional rights, the state will bring up
other charges against them in an effort to defend. Harm done by these charges will
be just as immediate as that caused by charges brought up at the time of firing.
The charges contemplated are those which would reflect adversely on the dismissed
employee. For such charges to be effective as valid reasons for the state to dismiss
the employee, they would necessarily go toward his effectiveness in his job. Dismissal for no reason, valid for a non-tenured employee, would be highly suspect to the
court examining defendant's motives. This could cause public officers to come up
with spurious reasons for dismissal which not only would be untrue, but would by
definition reflect on plaintiff's fitness as an employee, affecting his community standings and employment prospects.
Justice Marshall's dissent in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 589 (1972),
recognizes that denial of employment itself "is a serious blow to any citizen."
67. Id. at 577.
68. 473 F.2d at 563, 564 n.1. This may be a restatement of the court's views on the
validity of the "waiver" defense discussed infra.
69. See Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 208 (1971).
At first glance
it would seem that the court, to be consistent with its holding that no non-tenured
employee could be discharged for exercising his constitutional rights, would have to
recognize some "implied promise of continued employment" to the employee who
performs his job in an adequate manner. However, the employee can still be discharged for any reason or no reason, as long as the reason is not an improper one,
and so he has no expectation of continued employment or implied promise thereof.
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CONCURRING OPINION

Though Judge Campbell" stated that his concurrence was based on
the line of cases cited by the majority, he noted that he felt the decision
was "dictated" in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Perry v. Sinderman.7 ' The concurrence was obviously troubled by the fact that
most of the cases relied upon by the majority came in the realm of academic freedom,7 which is a "special concern of the First Amendment,
which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom. ' 73 Thus he felt that these cases could arguably be distinguished from Lewis on the basis of the type of state employment involved. Sinderman, however, laid to rest his doubts in language
broad enough to make it plain that the court was referring to all state
employees rather than only teachers. 74 Though Sinderman involved a
teacher and could have been decided on the basis of prior decisions
such as Pickering v. Board of Education, it mentioned these only in
support of the decision reached, rather than as narrowly construed precedent in the area of academic freedoms.
The remainder of Judge Campbell's opinion was devoted to pointing
out problem areas which he felt deserved discussion in light of the holding. He noted that Shapp and Alomar both reached a decision contrary to that in Lewis,7' and that certiorari had been denied in Alomar
just six months before the decision in Sinderman, which did not discuss
or cite either case. This lends some credence to his suggestion that
academic freedom cases are not valid precedent in patronage situations, but a close examination of Sinderman leads to the conclusion
that the denial of certiorari in Alomar and the decision reached in
70. Judge William J. Campbell of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by
designation.

71.

Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1972).

72. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Pickering v. Board of
Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972);
Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183
(1952).
73. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
74. Judge Campbell cited Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972):
For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms
would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government
to "produce a result which [it] could not command directly." Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526.
Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible.
75. Judge Campbell also cited Norton v. Blaylock, 409 F.2d 772 (8th Cir. 1969),
as being in conflict with Lewis, however this case dealt primarily with a violation of
the merit system and the procedural process of terminating a civil service employee.
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Sinderman have no bearing on each other. No lower court opinions
were mentioned in Sinderman, though several Supreme Court decisions
were cited which dealt with denials of public employment in fields other
than academic, including all cases relied upon by the Lewis majority.7"
As the concurrence silently concluded, it is error to read too much into
a denial of certiorari which may have hinged on reasons totally unre77
lated to the law in the case.
Judge Campbell's second area of concern was the potential impact of
the decision on state and local governments and on the federal court.
He felt that the court would become a "super civil service commission"
for state and local employees not already covered by civil service.78
Judge Campbell is correct in his analysis, but as the majority inferred, if the state persists in violating its employees' constitutional
rights, the federal court must vindicate these rights. The greater the
number of persons affected, the more immediate becomes the need to
put a stop to the practice. 79 This logic is especially compelling in view
of the rapidly increasing number of persons employed by various units
of government.
The concurrence pointed out that in the case at bar, the number of
possible trials and appeals could reach 1,946, the number of employees
discharged by Lewis. This figure represents only one department of
one state government in one change of administration. The volume
of potential litigation, as the Judge noted, could be castastrophic.
This criticism must be evaluated in light of the number of such cases
likely to be litigated, a figure far smaller than that the concurrence
fears. This reduction would be primarily due to the restrictions laid
down by the majority opinion which would serve to winnow out potential claimants, as well as a realization by state officials that politi76. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
77. This analysis was confirmed when the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Lewis. See note 13.
78. 473 F.2d at 578.
79. The majority also analyzed this problem after the defendant brought up the
point that no federal court could impose a civil service system on the state.
The court distinguished between the effects of the fourteenth amendment and a
civil service system: The fourteenth amendment does not produce job security; the
employee can be fired for any reason or no reason, as long as the reason is proper.
The court stated: "There is a clear distinction between the grant of tenure to an
employee-a right which cannot be conferred by judicial fiat-and the prohibition of
a discharge for a particular impermissible reason." 473 F.2d at 567.
The majority also noted that the burden of proof to show no impermissible dismissal would be thrust upon the state only after a potential plaintiff made a prima

facie case in support of his claim.
ployee.

The actual burden would remain with the em-
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cally motivated firings will only result in time consuming and poten-

tially embarrassing litigation.
The probable solution to the problem would be extension of the civil
service system to all non-policy making employees, to provide a relatively fast and quiet administrative system to facilitate discharge. This
would eliminate the spector of the federal government ruling over state
employment practices and reduce the amount of litigation to a figure pro-

portionately above that currently encountered in civil service dismissals. 8° Additionally, these cases are for the most part class actions
brought by employees' unions. Individual plaintiffs are not likely to
have the resources necessary to bring suit, a potentially limiting factor
in the number of docket hours devoted to trying such actions.
Judge Campbell's final observation concerned the judicial standards
by which non-policy making and policy making employees will be separated. Since this particular factual issue was not before the court,
the majority mentioned the distinction without giving clues as to criteria by which employees would be classified, leaving the matter to
the determination of the district court. The concurring opinion stated
that the constitution would permit firing of "policy implementing" as
well as "policy making" employees. 8 '
Policy implementing employees would fall within the standards outlined by the majority, which included employees whose loyalty to the
80. Such a change could be expected soon after a final court ruling to the effect
that politically motivated dismissals will not be allowed. The current administration
will try to "lock" their employees into their jobs before the Republicans can get
back into office and do the same. At first glance it would seem that a finalized
ruling would preclude another cycle of hirings and firings. However in many instances the state will be able to come up with other reasons, valid or otherwise, to
dismiss non-civil service employees. This is a major problem which will have to be faced
after Lewis. It will be a rare plaintiff whose employment record is so spotless that
some basis for dismissal cannot be found. Whether the courts will be able to see
through these smoke-screened political dismissals, and if so, what measure of relief
will be granted, are questions remaining to be answered.
Additionally, if a plaintiff wins a Lewis-type suit and is reinstated, how soon can he
be dismissed without casting doubts on the legality of the dismissal? It is the prerogative of the state to discharge a non-civil service employee at will. How many
times must the employee bring suit to defend his job if the state is determined to get
rid of him? A parallel in this area may be drawn to retaliatory eviction cases and
the standards employed to test the legality of an eviction subsequent to one which has
been voided.
In view of the close relationship between political parties, government action, and
public employment, what would be the effect of an employee's peers bringing pressure
on him to quit? What would constitute state harassment of the employee? These
variables could make the remedy of reinstatement untenable. By the time litigation
over a political dismissal is at an end, the relationship between the employee and his
employer may have deteriorated to such an extent that governmental efficiency would
compel the employee to be fired again.
A civil service statute covering all non-policy making state employees would help to
solve these questions, many of which will present thorny problems for the courts.
81. 473 F.2d at 578.

476

Case Comments

1973

particular administrative head was needed to effectively carry out state
policies. This category of employees would include both those whose
positions would entitle them to potentially damaging knowledge and
those who could frustrate the program of the particular officer. The
problem comes in drawing a line between policy implementers who can
be constitutionally discharged for political affiliation and those who
cannot. In a sense even a road construction worker implements
state policy.
In some instances the question will be a hard one for the courts, but
one which is within reach of effective judicial determination. Issues
presented will ultimately be decided on a case by case basis. Separation will have to come at a point where it becomes reasonably necessary
to discharge employees for political affiliation in order to effectively
carry out state government, keeping in mind that what is good for the
state is not necessarily good for the political party. This standard is
tenuous, but not so remote that judicial determination based upon it
will be arbitrary. Because of the fluctuating nature of employment duties, a degree of discretion must be built in to whatever standard is
eventually adopted by the courts.
The concurring opinion also felt that an equal protection problem
might be presented by discharging some employees for reasons of political affiliation and not others. However, if the line is drawn at a
point where a valid governmental interest can be inferred, the categories created would not be so unreasonable as to call for application of
the doctrine.8 2
CONCLUSION

Lewis represents a step forward in judicial recognition of public employees' constitutional rights.8 3 Nevertheless, the opinion should not
be construed too broadly.
The sufficiency of the justifications raised by the state were not explored by the majority, but the language of the opinion indicated that
waiver defenses may be acceptable if the employee gained his job
82. Equal protection was not brought up by either party in Lewis, though such
an issue may be raised in the context of protecting some employees under civil

service and not others.
83. The court noted that even though the spoils system had been entrenched in
American politics and government for over 200 years, this fact was irrelevant to the
claim presented. The majority stated: "We therefore abjure argument founded only
on political tradition in the State of Illinois or on notions of policy which may or may

not lead to the extension of the civil service system. .
amendment rights of a citizen ..
" 473 F.2d at 569.

.

. Our concern is with the first
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through political sponsorship. Granting such a defense would blunt
the practical effect of the Lewis decision and serve to perpetuate the
patronage system.
The majority also warned that the sufficiency of all the plaintiffs'
claims in the class action was in doubt. The opinion termed the issue
as "whether a non-policy making employee. . . may be discharged for
refusing to transfer his political allegiance from one political party to
another," 4 though the court implied that merely dismissing an employee for reasons of political affiliation would likewise be circumscribed in the proper situation. The majority analyzed the problem by
assuming that:
[P]laintiffs were performing their jobs competently, that they have
no responsibility for determining policy, that they were discharged
simply because they are Democrats, and that, in at least some instances, they were offered continued employment if they would
actively support the Republican Party.85
Questions remaining as to the sufficiency of justifications, remedies
available, and eligible plaintiffs must be settled at a later date, probably
on an individual case basis because of the singular nature of the facts
in each case as they relate to the type and level of employment within
the state government. The district court in Lewis will solve some questions when it grapples with the problems remanded by the Seventh
Circuit. Final answers will not come until the Supreme Court balances
86
the arguments of public employees and patronage forces.
ROBERT CHRISTENSON

84. Id. at 566.
85. Id.
86. Lewis may force reappraisal of such cases as United Public Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75 (1947), in which a non-policy making federal employee was denied
rights of political activity, a form of association. Mitchell has been roundly criticized on the basis of later cases, many of which Lewis relied upon. Van Alstyne,
The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81

HAv.

L.

Rv. 1439, 1447 (1968); Rose, A Critical Look at the Hatch Act, 75 HARv. L. Rv.
510 (1962).
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